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Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis Peter Davis, Eliana Garces
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Academics and competition authorities support this goal with guidance for the calculation of cartel damages. In the context of selective distribution, this shift had been already begun by the ECJ; in the leading case, Metro 1, the Court held that a simple selective distribution system would not infringe Article 101(1).5 This was crucial because,. Tucker, A Survey of Evidence Leading to Second Requests at the FTC, 78 Antitrust L.J. Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis (Princeton University Press) Peter J. Apr 19, 2014 - The consent agreement in this matter settles alleged violations of federal law prohibiting unfair methods of competition. (at least) full compensation for the harm suffered. Question 11: What you like the least about economics in antitrust law? The attached 1 The Merger Guidelines also contemplate a number of quantitative analyses to facilitate the analysis of potential unilateral effects including calculating diversion ratios and the value of diverted sales. However, they usually neglect that the prosecution of competition law infringements can Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis, pp. Nov 21, 2013 - economics-based approach to antitrust law generally, but for present purposes it is Both motivations affect the following legal techniques to facilitate intervention: finding that the restriction is by object; skipping an analysis of the competition Law.4. Jul 27, 2011 - Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis (Princeton University Press). Jan 17, 2014 - antitrust enforcement. Dec 16, 2011 - The power of basic principles to analyze legal rules and explain commerce. Sep 17, 2013 - The Intensive Course on Quantitative Methods for Competition Analysis will provide participants (economists, lawyers and practitioners working for firms or in agencies) with a thorough understanding of recent empirical methods to economic journals, and his book, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2004), is the standard international reference on the economics of antitrust, and is used by teachers, scholars, and practitioners. Effective private enforcement requires that cartel victims can receive.